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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that the E¤ective Marginal Tax Rate (EMTR)
on income from capital has increased considerably in both the United States
and the United Kingdom over the period 1982-2005. This evidence contradicts
the corporate tax literature which predicts that the EMTR should instead fall
over time as a result of increasing international capital mobility and higher tax
competition between governments. This paper argues that this inconsistency
is entirely due to the fact that EMTRs on income from capital are currently
computed from versions of the neoclassical investment model which do not take
into account nancial constraints on dividend policy faced by rms investing
in both the United States and the United Kingdom. The paper incorporates
nancial constraints on dividend policy into the analytical framework for the
computation of the EMTR and employs the new model to re-calculate time
series of the EMTRs in both countries. The new empirical results show that, in
contrast to the existing evidence, the EMTR on investment nanced by either
retained earnings or new equity has indeed declined over time in both countries,
while the EMTR on debt-nanced investment has remained relatively stable.
Keywords: Capital income taxation; dividend policy; e¤ective marginal
tax rates; nancial constraints.
JEL classication: H3.
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1 Introduction
Since they were rst introduced by King and Fullerton (1984), E¤ective Mar-
ginal Tax Rates (EMTRs) on income from capital have been widely used by
international organisations and policy-makers, in both the United States and
Europe, for cross-country comparisons of the corporate tax burden and to
support reforms in public policy.1 Time series of EMTRs are also extensively
used in the empirical literature to assess the determinants of foreign direct
investment, the e¤ects of corporate income taxation on the international
allocation of capital, and the economic impact of tax policy reforms.2
The EMTR is computed from the neoclassical investment model as the ratio
between taxes levied on a hypothetical investment project earning the marginal
rate of return and either the pre-tax or post-tax return earned by the same
project. The main advantage of the EMTR is that it provides a single measure of
the e¤ective tax burden on income from capital which simultaneously takes into
account the impact of statutory tax rates and rules on the tax base assessment.
As prescribed by the traditional neoclassical investment literature pioneered by
Jorgenson (1963) and Jorgenson and Hall (1967), the impact of the rules for the
tax base assessment on the EMTR is captured by the e¤ect that tax allowances
for capital spending have on the return of income from capital. In particular,
according to the standard theory, the e¤ective tax burden falls when the tax code
grants higher tax allowances for capital spending. The incentive works because
rms can then defer part of their tax liability to the future, in turn increasing the
present value of dividend income distributable to shareholders or, equivalently,
reducing the present value of taxes levied on income from capital. Vice versa,
a reduction in the tax allowance on capital spending has the opposite e¤ect of
increasing the EMTR.
The focus of this paper is on the puzzling empirical evidence underpinning
the evolution of the EMTR in the United States and the United Kingdom.
Reforms of the corporate tax system in both countries since the early 1980s have
been characterised by two well-known trends: the fall in the statutory corporate
tax rate (SCTR) and the broadening of the corporate tax base brought about
by the reduction of tax allowances on capital spending. The existing empirical
evidence suggests that, as a result of these reforms, the EMTR on income from
capital has considerably increased in both the United States and the United
Kingdom over the period 1982-2005 regardless of the form of investment nance:
in other words, the base-broadening e¤ect, which increases the EMTR, has
crowded out the rate-cut e¤ect, which instead reduces the EMTR.3
This result is in clear contradiction with the traditional predictions of the
corporate tax literature which states that the corporate tax burden should in-
1See Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2005, 2006), Ernst & Young (2003), European
Commission (1992, 2001), Institute for Fiscal Studies (2009), and OECD (1991, 2007).
2See Backus, Henriksen, and Storesletten (2008), Burnham and Ozanne (2006), De Mooij
and Ederveen (2003), Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998a), Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano
(2008), and Slemrod (1990).
3For an in-depth discussion of this evidence, see Devereux, Gri¢ th and Klemm (2002).
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stead fall over time as a result of increasing international capital mobility and
higher tax competition between countries.4 The notion that there is increasing
competitive pressure on governments to reduce their corporation tax burdens
nds increasing support in the recent empirical literature - see for example Gar-
retsen and Peeters (2007) and Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008). The
ndings of this empirical literature are however entirely dependent on the choice
of the variable used to proxy the tax burden. Notably all these studies employ
the average e¤ective tax rate (EATR) rather than the EMTR, on the ground
that the former reects rmslocation decisions, while the latter is the appro-
priate indicator of the quantity of capital invested conditional on the choice of
location. As EATRs appear to decline over time, see Devereux, Gri¢ tth and
Klemm (2002), it is clear that they are negatively correlated with any indicator
of capital mobility. The reason however why EATRs appear to decline over time,
while EMTRs do not, is merely technical: although both indicators express the
impact of capital allowances on the e¤ective tax burden as a proportion of the
rate of return from investment, the EMTR uses at the denominator the mar-
ginal rate of return, while the EATR employs a rate of return higher than the
marginal one. As a result, by assuming an arbitrary high rate of return, EATRs
can hide away the negative e¤ect of declining tax depreciation allowances, in
turn resulting in a declining indicator of the tax burden.
This paper instead argues that the contradiction between theory and evi-
dence on the EMTR arises because the standard neoclassical investment model
employed for the measurement of the EMTR overstates the impact that vari-
ations of capital allowances have on the e¤ective tax burden, since it omits
constraints on earnings faced by rms investing in the United States and the
United Kingdom. In fact, any tax saving generated by the deferred tax liability
resulting from higher capital allowances only leads to a temporary di¤erence be-
tween the tax and economic assessments of prots, and accounting rules in both
countries prevent its distribution to shareholders. To this end, nancial con-
straints on dividend policy are imposed to prevent rms from distributing any
cash-ow arising from the tax saving generated by capital allowances. Therefore,
for tax policy analysis, capital allowances and nancial constraints on dividend
policy must be taken into account simultaneously when measuring the e¤ective
tax burden on income from capital.5
A preliminary investigation on the importance of nancial constraints in the
measurement of the e¤ective tax burden is o¤ered by Polito (2009), who uses
a generic neoclassical investment model for domestic investment nanced by
retained earnings to demonstrate that omission of nancial constraints on divi-
dend policy is bound to considerably understate any measure of the e¤ective tax
burden on income from capital, consequently leading to an incorrect assessment
4For a survey of this literature, see Wilson (1999) and Fuest, Huber and Mintz (2005).
5The importance of considering the e¤ect of dividend policy constraints for tax
policy analysis has already been pointed out in the economic literature. See, for
example, Alworth (1979), Boadway and Bruce (1979), Bordignon, Giannini and Pantegh-
ini (1999), Kanniainen and Södersten (1994, 1995), King (1974), Sinn (1987) and Sørensen
(1995).
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of the true impact of capital income taxation on investment choices.
This paper contributes to this line of research in three ways. First,
nancial constraints on dividend policy are applied to the extension of the King
and Fullerton (1984) methodology recently proposed by Devereux and Gri¢ th
(1998b, 2003). The Devereux-Gri¢ th model is chosen because it represents the
latest and most comprehensive approach for the measurement of EMTRs; it
provides a simple analytical framework which can be promptly implemented for
empirical analysis; and it is widely used and accepted by policy-makers and
academics. Second, the measurement of the EMTR is extended in this paper to
the case of domestic investment nanced by new equity and debt, rather than
considering retained earnings as the only source of nance, as in Polito (2009).
The third - and most important - novel contribution of the paper is empirical,
as the new analytical framework is then employed to re-calculate time series
of EMTRs in both the United States and the United Kingdom over the whole
period 1982-2005.
The ndings of the paper are as follows. The revised measures of the EMTRs
show indeed that, once nancial constraints on dividend policy are incorporated
into the model, the dynamic evolution of the EMTRs in the United States and
the United Kingdom is considerably di¤erent from that derived by the stan-
dard approach and it varies according to the form of investment nance: it has
declined over time - as predicted by the corporate tax literature - on investment
nanced by either retained earnings or new equity, while it has remained rela-
tively stable in the case of debt-nanced investment. Most importantly, there
is no evidence of increasing tax burden. Consequently, once averaged across
the three forms of nance, EMTRs show a declining trend as EATRs, in turn
suggesting that they are also indicators of the tax burden consistent with the
hypothesis that increasing tax competition has indeed resulted in a lower tax
burden over time.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews corporate tax
reforms and discusses the existing empirical evidence on the evolution of the
EMTR on income from capital in both the United States and the United
Kingdom over the last two decades. This section also provides a non-technical
description of how nancial constraints on dividend policy work in practice
and their implications for the measurement of the EMTR. Section 3 briey
outlines the logic underpinning the derivation of the EMTR on income from
capital in the neoclassical investment theory, while Section 4 shows how the
EMTR is computed using the Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998b, 2003) approach.
These measures of the EMTR are then compared and contrasted against those
obtained from the constrained model, which is described in Section 5. Section
6 presents the new empirical evidence and shows the importance, from a
quantitative point of view, of incorporating nancial constraints on dividend
policy into the neoclassical model. Section 7 concludes summarising the main
ndings and reects on the implications of this work for tax policy analysis.
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2 Existing empirical evidence and beyond
Reforms of the corporate tax system in the United States and the United King-
dom since the early 1980s have been characterised by two well-known trends: the
fall in the SCTR and the broadening of the corporate tax base brought about by
the reduction of tax allowances on capital spending.6 All data on the evolution
of the EMTRs in the United States, the United Kingdom and 17 other OECD
countries over the period 1982-2001 are available through Devereux, Gri¢ th
and Klemm (2002), who use this information to assess the impact of corporate
tax reforms on the EMTR over this period of time. However, their analysis
focuses on the average EMTR across the 19 countries, without explicitly dis-
closing the dynamic evolution of the EMTR in each individual country of the
sample. This paper therefore focuses on the evolution EMTRs in the United
States and the United Kingdom and extends the analysis up to 2005 using data
from the International Tax Database of the Institute for Fiscal Studies.7
Figure 1 shows that in the United States the SCTR has fallen from 50 per
cent in 1982 to 39 per cent in 2005 while, over the same period of time, the
gradual reduction of capital allowances has resulted in the fall of the present
discounted value (PDV) of capital allowances per unit of capital expenditure
in plant and machinery from 87 to 79 per cent.8 Figure 2 shows that similar
patterns are observed for the United Kingdom over the same period of time: the
SCTR has fallen considerably from 52 to 30 per cent, whereas the reduction of
capital allowances has resulted in a decrease in the PDV of capital allowances
for investment in plant and machinery from 100 to 73 per cent.9 The two gures
also show that this trend of falling capital allowances has only been temporarily
interrupted during periods of economic recession: allowances on capital spending
were high in the early 1980s in both countries, and were temporarily increased
in the early 2000 in the United States and in the early 1990s in the United
Kingdom.
The impact of these reforms on the EMTR measured in the two countries for
domestic investment in plant and machinery nanced by either retained earnings
or new equity is presented in Figures 3 and 4 respectively.10 In both countries the
EMTR is below the SCTR because tax allowances on capital spending on plant
and machinery have persistently exceeded the corresponding rate of economic
depreciation. However, the base-broadening e¤ect resulting from the reduction
6Rate-cutting and base-broadening reforms of the corporate tax system do not characterise
the United States and the United Kingdom alone, but are part of a more general trend observed
across the whole OECD area. For a recent survey, see OECD (2007).
7This database is available online at http://www.ifs.org.uk.
8The PDV of capital allowances increases with the rate of capital allowance, and ranges
from 0 to 100 per cent. When the tax code does not grant any allowance on capital spending,
then the PDV of capital allowances is zero. In contrast, the PDV is 100 per cent when the
tax code allows rms to deduct the entire cost of capital immediately.
9Capital allowances have also declined considerably in both countries for investment in
industrial buildings. See Devereux, Gri¢ th and Klemm (2002).
10The EMTR is computed without considering taxation at shareholder level. For this
reason, the EMTR on domestic investment nanced by retained earnings equals the EMTR
on the same type of investment nanced by new equity. See Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998b).
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of capital allowances has dominated the rate-cut e¤ect, thus causing the EMTR
to increase over the period 1982-2005, from 22 to 24 per cent in the United
States and from 0 to 20 per cent in the United Kingdom.
Figures 5 and 6 plot the evolution of the EMTR for domestic investment
nanced by debt. The EMTR under debt nance is well below zero in both
countries. This is because the EMTR on income from capital is equal to zero
when rms can deduct the cost of capital entirely (as in the case of debt nance)
and the tax allowance for capital spending reects the true economic
depreciation. Consequently, the EMTR becomes negative when the capital al-
lowance is larger than the rate of depreciation, meaning that the tax code is
indeed granting an investment subsidy to rms.11 Over the period 1982-2005,
however, the base broadening e¤ect due to the reduction of capital allowances
has reduced the extent of this subsidy e¤ect, in turn resulting in the EMTR
increasing from -94 to -46 per cent in the United States and from -72 to -32 per
cent in the United Kingdom.
The evidence presented so far clearly raises two important questions: rst,
the economic literature on corporate tax competition suggests that high
international capital mobility, coupled with increasing tax competition between
governments to attract new investment, should lead to a fall in the tax burden
on income from capital. However, this prediction clearly contradicts the
empirical evidence which appears to suggest that, rather than falling, EMTRs
on income from capital have been increasing over time. The second question
raised by this evidence refers to the rationale underpinning the observed
corporate tax policy reforms: if governments are eager to attract new
capital by providing a low-tax environment to investors, why would they o¤set
the benet from lower tax rates by broadening the corporate tax base?
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Figure 1: SCTR (Panel A) and present value of capital allowances on one unit
11See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) and Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998b).
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of investment in plant and machinery (Panel B) in the United States from
1982 to 2005. Sources: Devereux, Gri¢ th and Klemm (2002) and IFS
International Tax Database.
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Figure 2: SCTR (Panel A) and present value of capital allowances on one unit
of investment in plant and machinery (Panel B) in the United Kingdom from
1982 to 2005. Sources: Devereux, Gri¢ th and Klemm (2002) and IFS
International Tax Database.
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Figure 3: SCTR (  ) and EMTR ( - - - ) on domestic investment in plant
and machinery nanced by retained earnings in the United States from 1982
to 2005. Taxation at shareholder level is not included. Sources: Devereux,
Gri¢ th and Klemm (2002) and IFS International Tax Database.
7
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
Year
Ta
x 
R
at
e(
%
)
Figure 4: SCTR (  ) and EMTR ( - - - ) on domestic investment in plant
and machinery nanced by retained earnings in the United Kingdom from
1982 to 2005. Taxation at shareholder level is not included. Sources:
Devereux, Gri¢ th and Klemm (2002) and IFS International Tax Database.
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Figure 5: SCTR (  ) and EMTR ( - - - ) on domestic investment in plant
and machinery nanced by debt in the United States from 1982 to 2005.
Taxation at shareholder level is not included. Sources: Devereux, Gri¢ th and
Klemm (2002) and IFS International Tax Database.
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Figure 6: SCTR (  ) and EMTR ( - - - ) on domestic investment in plant
and machinery nanced by debt in the United Kingdom from 1982 to 2005.
Taxation at shareholder level is not included. Sources: Devereux, Gri¢ th and
Klemm (2002) and IFS International Tax Database.
This paper argues that the proposition that high capital mobility should
reduce the e¤ective tax burden on income from capital is indeed backed by the
data: the problem lies instead with the empirical evidence used in the literature,
which is drawn from an incorrect interpretation of how changes in the tax base,
caused by a reduction in capital allowances, impact on the e¤ective tax burden
on income from capital within the neoclassical investment model.
To clarify this point, note that the EMTR ultimately measures the tax bur-
den on the return from the marginal unit of investment, as measured by the
present value of dividends distributable to shareholders. According to the tra-
ditional corporate tax literature, a reduction in the statutory tax rate raises the
present value of dividends distributable to shareholders, in turn increasing the
after-tax marginal rate of return, thus reducing the EMTR. On the other hand,
for any given statutory tax rate, a reduction in the capital allowance increases
the tax base, hence reducing the present value of dividends distributable to
shareholders, thus leading to a higher EMTR. This widely accepted view of how
changes in the tax allowance on capital spending a¤ect a rms incentive to in-
vest is, however, misleading. This is because governments do not grant higher al-
lowances on capital spending to increase dividend payments to shareholders. In-
stead, capital
allowances are granted to provide rms with extra sources of internal
investment funding. This is ultimately a nancial tax incentive. The
incentive takes the form of deferred taxation and results only in a temporary
di¤erence between the tax and economic assessments of prots. Of course, rms
could use the extra funding arising from capital allowances to increase dividend
pay-outs rather than make new investments. This elusive behaviour is however
not possible in practice since any rm investing in the United States and the
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United Kingdom must comply with accounting standards which require them to
set full provision for deferred tax assets or liabilities arising from any temporary
di¤erences between the tax and economic assessments of prots.12
To illustrate how the nancial constraint works in practice, consider a rm
purchasing one unit of physical capital which generates a gross income of 100
dollars. Suppose the value of economic depreciation equals 10 dollars. Hence
the rms prot is 90 dollars. Suppose the corporate income tax rate is 30 per
cent and the tax code allows the rm to claim a capital allowance worth 20
dollars. Under an unconstrained model the tax base is 80 dollars, the rm pays
24 dollars in taxes and it is free to distribute to shareholders the remaining 66
dollars. Accounting standards require the rm to set a provision for
deferred taxes amounting to 3 dollars, equal to the tax on the di¤erence
between the tax allowance and the value of depreciation. This is recorded in
the company accounts as a deferred tax. Therefore, the total tax liability is
27 dollars, as a result of the sum of current and deferred taxes, and the rm
can distribute only 63 dollars to shareholders. If the rms keeps the resources
constrained in provisions for deferred taxes in a bank account which pays a 10
per cent interest rate, then dividend income distributable to shareholders rises
to 63.3 dollars.
This numerical example shows that the accounting standards result in a con-
straint on dividend policy which almost entirely prevents rms from distributing
dividends to shareholders out of higher tax allowances on capital spending. Ac-
cording to the neoclassical corporate tax literature, an increase in the allowance
on capital spending should reduce dividend income: in practice, as shown in the
example, an increase in the allowance has little e¤ect on the dividend pay-out.
The example also claries three key implications of this paper for tax policy
and empirical analyses. First, existing measures of the EMTR, which omits
nancial constraints on dividend policy, largely overstate the impact of capital
allowances on the e¤ective tax burden on income from capital. Second, since
variations in capital allowances have little e¤ect on dividend policy, there is no
contradiction in the rationale underpinning rate-cutting and base-broadening
reforms observed in the United States and the United Kingdom since the early
1980s. Third, as it is shown in the rest of the paper, after incorporating nancial
constraints on dividend policy into the model, the EMTR on income from capital
closely follows the declining dynamic of the SCTR. Therefore, any empirical
research on the impact of corporate taxation on the international allocation
of capital which is based on the existing measures of the EMTR is bound to
employ a highly mis-specied time series of the e¤ective tax burden on income
from capital.
12This principle is essentially encompassed by modern accounting standards. Under In-
ternational Financial Reporting Standards, deferred tax should be accounted for using the
principles in IAS 12: Income Taxes, which is similar (but not identical) to SFAS 109 un-
der US GAAP. Both these accounting standards require a temporary di¤erence approach as
described in the text.
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3 Neoclassical investment theory and the EMTR
on income from capital
The standard neoclassical investment model underpinning the computation of
the EMTR considers a competitive rm seeking to maximise its shareholders
wealth, W0, while facing a perfectly elastic supply of capital and a frictionless
capital market, where it can borrow and lend at the constant nominal interest
rate i. Investment choices are riskless and taken in the absence of bankruptcy
costs. The objective function of the rm is generally formulated as
W0 =
1X
t=0
Dt  Nt
(1 + )
t ; (1)
where Dt denotes the change in dividend income in period t, Nt is the
change in new equity issues in period t,  is the after-tax income received by
shareholders for any unit increase in dividend income, and  is the shareholders
discount rate. In particular,  =
 
1 md = (1  z) (1  c), where md, z and c
measure the personal tax rates on dividend income, capital gain and the
imputation rate, respectively; whereas  = i
 
1 mi = (1  z), with mi
denoting the personal tax rate on interest income.
Dividend income is computed in any period t from the identity between
sources and uses of funds
Bt +Nt +Qt (Kt 1)  iBt 1 = Dt + It + Tt; (2)
where Bt denotes the change in the stock of debt in period t, Qt (Kt 1) is
output in period t depending on the stock of capital in the previous period,
Kt 1, iBt 1 measures interest payments on the outstanding stock of debt, It is
new investment undertaken in period t, and Tt measures the period t corporate
tax liability.13 The capital stock evolves according to the capital accumulation
equation
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It; (3)
where  is the rate of physical depreciation of the capital stock. The corporate
tax literature typically formulates the tax function as
Tt = 

Qt (Kt 1)  iBt 1   
 
It +K
T
t 1

; (4)
where  is the statutory tax rate,  is the tax allowance on capital spending,
and KTt 1 is the tax-written-down value of the capital stock at the end of period
t, which evolves according to
KTt = (1  )KTt 1 + It: (5)
13Qt (:) denotes a standard neoclassical production function, continuos and twice di¤eren-
tiable, with positive rst derivative and negative second derivative, and satisfying the Inada
conditions.
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Following Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967), the after-tax user
cost of capital, ~p, is calculated by maximising wealth in equation (1), subject to
the
constraints in equations (2) to (5). The EMTR, which summarises the
impact of taxes on the marginal return from investment, is then dened as
the di¤erence between the user cost of capital after and before taxes, measured
as a proportion of the after-tax user cost of capital:
EMTRj;k =
~pj;k   r
~pj;k
= 1  r
~pj;k
; (6)
where r measures the marginal rate of return in the absence of taxes, the
subscript j = U;C indicates that the computation is carried out from the "un-
constrained" and "constrained" models respectively, while the subscript k =
RE;NE;B distinguishes
between three traditional forms of investment nance considered in the
corporate tax literature: retained earnings (RE), new equity issues (NE) and
debt (B). Equation (6) shows that any tax measure that increases (reduces)
the user cost of capital has the e¤ect of increasing (decreasing) the EMTR on
income from capital. For this reason, hereafter the analysis will focus only on
the impact that the tax system has on the user cost of capital.
4 Unconstrained EMTR
To explicitly compute the user cost of capital this paper follows the approach
recently proposed by Devereux and Gri¢ th (1998b, 2003). The essential idea
behind this approach is to determine the user cost of capital from a temporary
perturbation of the capital stock: the rm purchases one unit of capital in
period t and reduces investment in period t + 1 by (1  ) (1 + ) where  is
the ination rate from t to t + 1. The temporary increase in the capital stock
yields a return in period t+1 equal to (~pU;k + ) (1 + ), where ~pU;k denotes the
marginal rate of return previously dened with k = RE;NE;B. In the absence
of taxes, ~pU;k = r, where r is the real rate of return determined from the Fisher
equation (1 + i) = (1 + r) (1 + ). As pointed out above, the e¤ect of corporate
income taxation on investment choices is summarised by the impact that the
tax code has on the user cost of capital, which in turn depends on the type of
investment nance. The general formulation of the after-tax user cost of capital
for domestic investment is therefore given by
~pU;k =
(1 A) [+  (1 + )  ]
(1 + ) (1  )  
FU;k (1 + )
 (1 + ) (1  )   ; (7)
where A is the tax saving on the PDV of tax allowances on capital spending,
granted at the rate , and FU;k, with k = RE;NE;B, measures the impact of
alternative forms of nance on the user cost of capital. In particular, it follows
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that
FU;RE = 0 (8)
FU;NE =   (1  ) (1  )
1 + 
(9)
FU;B = 
(1  ) [  i (1  )]
1 + 
(10)
when investment is nanced by retained earnings, new equity issues and debt
respectively.
Equations (7) and (10) can be employed to determine the impact of changes
in the tax allowance on capital spending on the user cost of capital, hence the
EMTR. To this end, consider a tax code granting the capital allowance  on a
declining balance basis, then
A = 
1X
s=0

1  
1 + 
s
= 
(1 + )
+ 
; (11)
which shows that an increase in the capital allowance rate raises the PDV of
tax allowances on capital spending since
@A
@
= 
(1 + ) 
(+ )
2 > 0:
Using these results, it is straightforward to show that the e¤ect of an increase
of the capital allowance rate on the user cost of capital under the three forms
of nance is given by
@~pU;RE
@
=   [+  (1 + )  ]
(1 + ) (1  )
@A
@
; (12)
@~pU;NE
@
=
@~pU;RE
@
   (1  )
 (1 + ) (1  ) ; (13)
@~pU;B
@
=
@~pU;RE
@
+
 [  i (1  )]
(1 + ) (1  ) : (14)
In essence, the unconstrained model predicts that a reduction in the capital
allowance always increases the EMTR on domestic investment nanced by re-
tained earnings. This also applies when investment is nanced by new equity
and dividend income is taxed more heavily than capital gains. The e¤ect of
reductions in the capital allowance on the EMTR when investment is nanced
by debt is in principle ambiguous: on the one hand, the lower capital allowance
increases the retained earnings component of the user cost of capital, as com-
puted by the rst term on the right-hand side of equation (14), while on the
other hand it increases the benet from debt nancing, as measured by the last
term in equation (14).
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5 Constrained EMTR
This section introduces nancial constraints on dividend policy faced by rms
investing in the United States and the United Kingdom into the Devereux and
Gri¢ th (1998b, 2003) formulae of the user cost of capital. As described in Sec-
tion 2, nancial constraints on dividend policy require rms to set in any period
t a provision for deferred taxes, equal to the tax rate on the di¤erence between
the capital allowance and economic depreciation, namely 
 
KTt   Kt

. This
implies that dividend income in any period t cannot exceed the after-tax prot,
reduced by the tax rate on the di¤erence between the capital allowance and
the depreciation rate. Notice that under the accounting standards followed by
rms investing in both the United States and the United Kingdom, provision for
deferred taxes are measured on the di¤erence between accounting and tax depre-
ciation, whereas the above denition of the period t provision for deferred taxes
assumes that economic depreciation equals accounting depreciation. We retain
this assumption on that basis that it is consistent with the standard conventions
in the established literature on tax policy and nancial constraints - see pre-
viously cited papers by Boadway and Bruce (1979), Kanniainen and Södersten
(1994 and 1995), King (1974), Sørensen (1995) - and also taking into account
the fact that over the past 20 years accounting standards followed by United
States and United Kingdom companies have increased their exibility in order
to align accounting depreciation to economic depreciation. Indeed, the IAS 16
(International GAAP 2010) does not prescribe any specic method and/or rate
of depreciation for accounting purposes, as it requires the depreciation charge
to reect the pattern of consumption of the benets the assets brings over its
useful life, which is essentially consistent with economic depreciation.
As stated by Kanniainen and Södersten (1995), the positive (negative) tem-
porary di¤erence between the capital allowance and the rate of depreciation
represents a deferred tax liability (asset) which must be retained by the rm
rather than be distributed to shareholders. In principle, the constrained liq-
uidity should be used to carry out new investment. However, this would be in
conict with the model assumption of a one-unit increase in capital in period
t and constant capital stock starting from t + 1. As a result, following Polito
(2009), nancial resources constrained in provisions for deferred taxes represent
an excess of liquidity that rms can only invest in the capital markets. In turn,
this implies that deferred taxation generates to shareholders a cash-ow equal
to the after-tax rate of return on the resources constrained in provisions for
deferred taxes.
There are several equivalent ways of incorporating nancial constraints on
dividend policy into the neoclassical investment model. King (1974) and
Kanniainen and Södersten (1995) treat the dividend policy constraint just as an
extra constraint in the maximisation problem of the rm. Polito (2009) shows
that the nancial constraint can also be incorporated into the neoclassical model
by opportunely modifying the identity between sources and uses of funds. This
paper instead introduces nancial constraints into the model by specifying the
total tax liability of the rm in any period t, Tt, as the sum of current and
14
deferred taxes. In particular, the corporate tax function can be formulated as
Tt = T
c
t + T
d
t ; (15)
where current taxes T ct are dened as in equation (4), and T
d
t denotes deferred
taxes, which can be written as
T dt = 
 
KTt   Kt

; (16)
which shows that after accounting for deferred taxes a new source tax liability
arises to shareholders in the form of undistributable tax savings. The formula-
tion of the tax function in equations (15) and (16) is essentially consistent with
how rms report their tax liability in their accounts, hence providing a very
transparent way of disclosing the impact of the constraint on dividend policy.14
When using the denition of the tax function in equations (15) and (16), the
user cost of capital on domestic investment under the dividend policy constraint
is formulated as
~pC;k =

1 A +  i
 
1   i [+  (1 + )  ]
(1 + ) (1  )  
FC;k (1 + )
 (1 + ) (1  )   ;
(17)
where k = RE;NE;B;  i is the tax rate on nancial income and
 = A  A = i (1 + i) (  )
(i+ ) (i+ )
is the present value of provisions for deferred taxes, with A denoting the present
value of depreciation.15 Note that  R 0 if A R A, which holds as long as
 R . The economic interpretation of equation (17) is provided below for each
of the three forms of nance.
When investment is nanced by retained earnings, FC;RE = 0 and the user
cost of capital under the constrained model is written as
~pC;RE = ~pU;RE +

1  i  1   i [+  (1 + )  ]
(1 + ) (1  ) ; (18)
where ~pU;RE is the user cost of capital on investment nanced by retained
earnings obtained from the unconstrained model obtained after replacing (8)
into (7). Equation (18) shows that the nancial constraint adds two terms to
the user cost of capital derived from the unconstrained model: the rst term,
[+(1+) ]
(1+)(1 ) , measures the increase in the user cost of capital in terms of fore-
gone dividend caused by the accumulation of provisions for deferred taxes. The
second term,  i  1   i [+(1+) ](1+)(1 ) , measures the reduction in the user cost
of capital
due to the investment in the capital markets of resources accumulated in
14For a detailed description of the rules for recording temporary di¤erences in a companys
nancial statement, see Alexander and Archer (2009).
15A is measured by replacing  with  in equation (11).
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provisions for deferred taxes. In addition, equation (18) shows that ~pC;RE >
~pU;RE as long as  > : in other words, whenever the tax code grants a
nancial tax incentive ( > ), the EMTR on domestic investment, after cor-
rectly accounting for deferred taxes, is always greater than the EMTR computed
from the unconstrained model. Di¤erentiation of (18) with respect to the capital
allowance leads to
@~pC;RE
@
=
@~pU;RE
@
+

1  i  1   i [+  (1 + )  ]
(1 + ) (1  )
@A
@
= i
 
1   i @~pU;RE
@
: (19)
Equation ((19)) shows that an increase in the tax allowance on capital spending
has a limited impact (only a fraction i
 
1   i of the e¤ect predicted by the
unconstrained model) on the user cost of capital and the EMTR. Therefore,
the results in equations (18) and (19) show that whenever the tax code grants
a nancial tax incentive, omission of the nancial constraint associated with
deferred taxation is bound to understate the true measure of the user cost of
capital and the EMTR, as well as overstating the impact that changes in the
capital allowance have on the incentive to invest.
When investment is nanced by new equity, in period t the rm receives
a tax allowance  but has to set a provision for deferred taxes of  (  ).
This amount of resources is invested in the capital markets and generates an
after-tax return i
 
1   i  (  ). Hence, the net amount of new equity raised
is (1  )  i  1   i  (  ). Since funds are used to repurchase this amount
of new equity in period t+1, then the shareholder receives a similar amount in
period t+ 1 as a repurchase of equity. Combining these e¤ects, the user cost of
capital on domestic investment nanced by new equity under the constrained
model is formulated as
~pC;NE = ~pC;RE   FC;NE (1 + )
 (1 + ) (1  ) ; (20)
where
FC;NE = FU;NE  
 (1  ) (  )  i  1   i (  )
1 + 
: (21)
Equations (20) and (21) show that the impact of the nancial constraint on
the user cost of capital and the EMTR ultimately depends on the taxation of
dividend income relative to capital gains: if the tax code grants a nancial tax
incentive ( > ), then omission of the nancial constraint leads to the
understatement (overstatement) of the user cost of capital and the EMTR when
dividend income is taxed more (less) than capital gains. In addition, equation
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(21) implies that
@FC;NE
@
=
@FU;NE
@
   (1  )
1 + 
+
i
 
1   i  (1  )
1 + 
= i
 
1   i @FU;NE
@
;
which shows that changes in the tax allowance on capital spending have an e¤ect
on the new equity component of the user cost of capital considerably smaller
than that predicted by the unconstrained model. Likewise, it follows that
@~pC;NE
@
=
@~pC;RE
@
  @FC;NE
@
(1 + )
 (1 + ) (1  )
= i
 
1   i @~pU;NE
@
;
with ~pU;NE denoting the user cost of capital on investment nanced by new
equity obtained from the unconstrained model after replacing (9) into (7), which
shows that the user cost of capital and the EMTR also respond to changes in
the tax allowance on capital spending much less than predicted by the standard
theory when investment is nanced by new equity.
Finally, when investment is nanced by debt shareholders in period t do
not have to give up dividend income worth (1  )   i  1   i  (  ). In-
stead the rm borrows this amount. In period t + 1, the rm must repay the
debt with interest, and this results in a reduction of shareholderscash-ow of
(1  )  i  1   i  (  ) [1 + i (1  )]. Combining these e¤ects, the user
cost of capital on debt-nanced investment can be formulated as
~pC;B = ~pC;RE   FC;B (1 + )
 (1 + ) (1  ) ; (22)
where
FC;B = FU;B +  (  )  [  i (1  )]
1 + 
  i  1   i  (  )  [  i (1  )]
1 + 
:
(23)
Equation (23) shows that debt nancing provides an even greater incentive on
the marginal choice to invest than predicted by the unconstrained model. This is
because, as argued by Kanniainen and Södersten (1995), resources constrained in
provisions for deferred taxes represent an interest-free loan from the government:
hence, rms nancing investment by debt can exploit this interest-free borrowing
opportunity, as measured by the second term on the right-hand side of equation
(23). As for the case of new equity nance, it is straightforward to show that a
change in the capital allowance has a much smaller e¤ect on the debt component
of the user cost of capital than that predicted under the standard theory since
@FC;B
@
=  i  1   i  [  i (1  )]
1 + 
=  i (1  ) @FU;B
@
:
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Consequently, also in the case of domestic investment nanced by debt, the
impact of variations in the tax allowances on capital spending in the constrained
model is much smaller than that predicted by the unconstrained model since:
@~pC;B
@
= i
 
1   i @~pU;RE
@
+ i
 
1   i @FU;B
@
(1 + )
 (1 + ) (1  )
= i
 
1   i @~pU;B
@
;
where ~pU;B is the user cost of capital on investment nanced by debt obtained
from the unconstrained model after replacing (10) into (7).
To summarise, this section has demonstrated analytically that, after cor-
rectly accounting for deferred taxation, a reduction in the tax allowance on
capital spending has a considerably smaller e¤ect on the EMTR on income
from capital than predicted by the unconstrained model. This results holds
regardless of the form of investment nance. This results also holds regardless
how rms distribute earnings to shareholders. In the context of the neoclassical
model used in this paper, deferred taxation acts as a constraint on dividend
distribution because earnings are transferred to shareholders though dividends.
However, the constraint works under any other form of earnings distribution:
as shown in equation (16), accounting rules reclassify part of earnings as future
tax liabilities, hence reducing the overall value of the rm. Only the return
on the investment of the deferred tax liability increases the value of the rm.
In a sense, this is consistent with Modigliani-Miller view that only the rate of
return generated by the rm matters, while the form of investment nance is
irrelevant.
6 Empirical evidence revisited
This section provides a quantitative assessment of the analytical results
discussed so far, by comparing and contrasting the development of EMTRs
computed from the constrained and unconstrained models. All computations
are carried out using tax data for the United States and the United Kingdom
over the period 1982-2005 previously described and following Devereux, Gri¢ th
and Klemm (2002)s calibration of the model, which considers only domestic
investment in plant and machinery; does not include taxation at shareholder
level; and assumes that plant and machinery depreciate at 12.25 per cent on a
declining balance basis, the real interest rate is 10 per cent, and the ination
rate is 3.5 per cent.
Figures 7 and 8 plot, for the United States and the United Kingdom
respectively, the evolution over the period 1982-2005 of the SCTR and of the
EMTRs under both the constrained and unconstrained models when domestic
investment is nanced by retained earnings. Since the basic calibration of the
model does not consider taxation at shareholder level, these results also apply
to the case of new equity nance. The gures show that, deferred taxation is
correctly incorporated into the model, the intertemporal evolution of the EMTR
18
is much closer to that of the SCTR than predicted by the unconstrained model.
Therefore, falling capital allowances had little impact on the evolution of the tax
burden on income from capital and the EMTR has been declining over time in
both countries. The two gures also show that enhanced capital allowances
temporarily provided in the United States in the early 2000s and in the United
Kingdom during the early 1990s had little impact on the EMTR. In turn, this
also suggests that the e¤ectiveness of higher capital allowances as a scal policy
tool to provide an incentive for
capital accumulation during an economic recession is probably largely over-
stated by the standard analysis. This is a very important implication for tax
policy analysis, since both the United States and the United Kingdom have
increased tax allowances on capital spending in an attempt to encourage
private sector investment and promote faster economic growth after the 2007-
2009 nancial crisis and global economic downturn.16
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Figure 7: SCTR (  ), EMTRU ( - - - ) and EMTRC (   ) on domestic
investment in plant and machinery nanced by retained earnings or new
equity in the United States from 1982 to 2005. Taxation at shareholder level is
not included.
16The 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) has allowed additional rst-
year depreciation of 50 per cent of purchase cost by extending for one year the depreciation
bonus created by the 2008 Economic Stimulus Act. The HM Treasury Budget 2009 has also
announced a one-year increase in capital allowances from 20 to 40 per cent.
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Figure 8: SCTR (  ), EMTRU ( - - - ) and EMTRC (   ) on domestic
investment in plant and machinery nanced by either retained earnings or new
equity in the United Kingdom from 1982 to 2005. Taxation at shareholder
level is not included.
Figures 9 and 10 consider the evolution of the EMTR in the United States
and the United Kingdom under debt-nanced domestic investment. As
mentioned in Section 2, the EMTR on income from capital is less than zero
- meaning that the tax code is indeed granting an investment subsidy to rms -
when rms can deduct the cost of capital entirely as under debt nance the tax
allowance for capital spending exceeds the economic depreciation. Therefore, the
two gures show that the nancial constraint on domestic investment nanced
by debt has the e¤ect of almost entirely neutralising the impact of variations in
capital allowances, in turn restoring tax neutrality under debt-nanced
investment.
20
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
-100
-50
0
50
Year
Ta
x 
R
at
e(
%
)
Figure 9: SCTR (  ), EMTRU ( - - - ) and EMTRC (   ) on domestic
investment in plant and machinery nanced by debt in the United States from
1982 to 2005. Taxation at shareholder level is not included.
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Figure 10: SCTR (  ), EMTRU ( - - - ) and EMTRC (   ) on domestic
investment in plant and machinery nanced by debt in the United Kingdom
from 1982 to 2005. Taxation at shareholder level is not included.
Table 1 quanties the patterns presented in Figures 7 to 10. The uncon-
strained model predicts that when investment is nanced by either retained earn-
ings or new equity the average EMTR is well below the average
SCTR, while debt nancing coupled with enhanced capital allowances has
resulted in a negative EMTR, on average, over the period 1982-2005. In
contrast, once nancial constraints are correctly incorporated into the model,
the EMTR on investment nanced by retained earnings or new equity has been,
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on average, quite close to the average statutory tax rate, while being close to
zero for debt-nanced investment.17
SCTR EMTRU EMTRC EMTRU EMTRC
Equity nance Debt nance
United States
1982 50 22 48 -94 -2.8
2005 39 24 37 -46 -2.2
Average 41 22 39 -56 -2.3
St. Dev. 4.4 2.4 4.5 20.1 0.2
United Kingdom
1982 52 0 49 -70 -2.3
2005 30 20 28 -28 -1.9
Average 35 20 33 -35 -2.0
St. Dev. 6.1 6.5 5.8 12.0 0.1
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: statutory corporate and e¤ective marginal tax
rates in the United States and in the United Kingdom, 1982-2005.
Finally, the robustness of these ndings is explored along a number of di¤er-
ent proles. First, the computation of EMTR is extended to take into account
taxation at personal level (hence  6= 1) in both countries under the three forms
of nance. Figure 11 plots the evolution of the average EMTR resulting in each
country after assuming that investment is nanced 55 per cent by retained earn-
ings, 10 per cent by new equity and 35 per cent by debt.18 Figure 12 presents
average EMTRs time series for investment in industrial buildings, whereas g-
ure 13 plots average EMTRs time series on an investment including both plant
and machinery and industrial buildings. Finally, gures 14 and 15 examine the
e¤ect of accounting depreciation being higher or lower than economic depreci-
ation. Visual inspection of these results corroborates the previous evidence on
the intertemporal evolution of the e¤ective tax burden on income from capital
in the United States and the United Kingdom over the last 25 years: the EMTR
has declined in both countries regardless of the form of investment nance and
the type of investment asset. The declining pattern of the EMTR is also in-
dependent from the gap between economic and accounting depreciation: given
economic and tax rates of depreciation, the higher is the rate of accounting de-
preciation, the lower is the EMTR relative to the SCTR, since this contributes
to reduce the size of provisions for deferred taxes in turn limiting their impact
on the EMTR.
17Similar empirical results to those described in this section are also obtained when
considering domestic investment in industrial buildings. These results are not reported in
the paper for reasons of space, but are available from the author upon request.
18These shares are taken from Chennells and Gri¢ th (1997).
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Figure 11: SCTR (  ), EMTRU ( - - - ) and EMTRC (   ) on domestic
investment in plant and machinery nanced by retained earnings (55%), new
equity (10%) and debt (35%). Taxation at shareholder level included.
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Figure 12: SCTR (  ), EMTRU ( - - - ) and EMTRC (   ) on domestic
investment in industrial buildings nanced by retained earnings (55%), new
equity (10%) and debt (35%) from 1982 to 2005. Taxation at shareholder level
included.
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Figure 13: SCTR (  ), EMTRU ( - - - ) and EMTRC (   ) on domestic
investment in plant and machinery (75%) and industrial buildings (25%)
nanced by retained earnings (55%), new equity (10%) and debt (35%) from
1982 to 2005. Taxation at shareholder level included.
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Figure 14: SCTR (  ), EMTRU ( - - - ) and EMTRC (   ) on domestic
investment in plant and machinery nanced by retained earnings or new
equity from 1982 to 2005. Taxation at shareholder level is not included.
Accounting depreciation rate 10%, economic depreciation rate 12.5%.
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Figure 15: SCTR (  ), EMTRU ( - - - ) and EMTRC (   ) on domestic
investment in plant and machinery nanced by retained earnings or new
equity from 1982 to 2005. Taxation at shareholder level is not included.
Accounting depreciation rate 15%, economic depreciation rate 12.5%.
7 Conclusion
The need to produce measures of the EMTR on income from capital is important
not only as a scientic exercise, but also for tax policy analysis and planning
tax reforms. Such an approach, which has roots in the early work by King and
Fullerton in the 1980s and has been subsequently developed by Devereux and
Gri¢ th, yields time series of the EMTR which show that, regardless of the form
of nance, the corporate tax burden has increased in both the United States and
the United Kingdom over the last 25 years. This trend contradicts the tradi-
tional economic wisdom, which instead suggests that the EMTR should fall over
time as a result of increasing capital mobility and tax competition. This paper
shows that this contradiction between theory and evidence arises because the
computation of the EMTR omits the e¤ect of dividend policy constraints faced
by rms in the United States and the United Kingdom. Company law in both
countries encompasses the fundamental principle that the capital share must be
maintained in the corporate sector, and thus imposes nancial constraints on
dividend policy which prevent rms from distributing to shareholders any tax
saving arising from enhanced capital allowances. The paper extends previous re-
search in this area by incorporating nancial constraints into the framework for
the computation of the EMTR prescribed by Devereux-Gri¢ th (1998b, 2003)
and re-computes time series of the EMTR under the new constrained model in
both countries over the period 1982-2005. The new empirical results show - in
sharp contrast with the existing evidence - that the EMTR on investment -
nanced by either retained earnings or new equity has indeed declined over time,
as predicted by the literature on corporate tax competition. On the other hand,
25
time series of the EMTR on debt-nanced investment have been relatively sta-
ble over time because nancial constraints on dividend policy have the ultimate
e¤ect of neutralising the benecial impact on the user cost of capital due to the
excess of capital allowances over economic depreciation.
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